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Russia is a late developer as to mediation. In contrast to the United States,
Western Europe, and the Far East, where mediation has been available for
decades,1 legislation authorizing mediation in Russia went into effect only at
the beginning of 2011. 2 Although Russian law scholars greeted this
institutional innovation with enthusiasm, ordinary Russians paid little
attention.3 Few have taken advantage of it. The leaders of the Moscow-based
Center for Mediation and Law argue that "[a]bsolutely all experts agree that
the development of mediation in Russia has been very weak."4 The Russian
scholarly literature is replete with explanations for the nonuse of mediation.
Most focus on the shortcomings of the legislation, with an occasional nod to
the potential role of legal culture. Given the historical preference for
doctrinally-driven research, the failure to ground theory in empirical data is
not surprising.5 This article, which analyzes Russians' views of mediation
gleaned through a series of 2014 focus groups, begins to fill that gap.
The focus group discussions confirm that the introduction of mediation
passed unnoticed by the general public in Russia. None of the ninety-nine
participants in the six focus groups in Moscow, Novosibirsk, and Voronezh
was aware of the availability of mediation. This might suggest that the answer
to the question posed by my title is simple. Russians can hardly be expected
to use an institutional tool of which they are unaware. While not discounting
the importance of this finding of universal ignorance, fully understanding
Russians' attitudes requires us to probe more deeply. The focus group format
facilitated this. Once the participants were made aware of the existence of
mediation, we encouraged an open discussion of its potential for Russia. Their
reactions provide an intriguing window into Russian legal culture. What
emerges is more of a kaleidoscope than a neat and tidy picture. Not only did
participants' attitudes evolve during the discussion, but they were far from a
mirror image of the views attributed to them by scholars. This serves to remind
Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR), in 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 70 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
2 "Ob al'temativnoi protsedure uregulrovaniia sporov s uchastiem posrednika
(protsedure mediatsii)", Federal'nyi zakon ot 27 iuliia 2010, No. 193-FZ,
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons doc LAW_103038/.
' luliia Vasil'eva, Neizbezhnoe primirenie, ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA (Apr. 23, 2012),
http://rg.ru/2012/04/23/mediacia-site.html.
4 Tsisana Shamlikashvili et al., Analiz prognozov i ekspertnykh otsenov razvitiia
mediativnoi praktiki v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, in BIULLETEN' FEDERAL'NOGO INSTITUTA
MEDIATSII 113 (Tsisana Shamlikashvili ed., 2014).
' S.I. Tiul'kanov, Stanovienie mediatsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, PSIKHOLOGICHESKAIA
NAUKA I OBRAZOVANIE no. 2, 2014 at 34.
[Vol. 32:3 20171
RESISTANCE, INDIFFERENCE OR IGNORANCE?
us of the importance of engaging with potential litigants and integrating their
actual opinions into our analysis and policy proposals.
In order to set the stage for this analysis, I begin with an overview of how
mediation came to Russia and how it is supposed to work. This is followed by
a summary of what we know about its use (or nonuse). I then synthesize the
diagnoses of the problem by the Russian scholarly community as well as their
prescriptions for curing it. The remainder of the article concentrates on the
focus groups, starting with a description of how they were organized and who
participated. This segues into an analysis of the participants' discussions of
mediation.
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDIATION IN RUSSIA
Russia would seem to be an ideal candidate for mediation. Russians'
preference for working out problems on their own ought to have created a
welcoming environment. Moreover, its courts are straining under an ever-
increasing caseload. Between 1995 and 2015, the number of cases resolved by
Russian trial courts more than quadrupled.6 Alla K. Bol'shova, the former
chairman of the Moscow city arbitrazh court, fears that the current burden on
the courts is not sustainable.7 The VII All-Russian Congress of Judges in
December 2012 agreed that the introduction of mediation "will permit the
improvement of the quality of justice and provide a reliable guarantee to
citizens of access to justice within a reasonable time."' Thus, much as in
Western countries, 9 mediation was adopted in Russia with the dual goals of
6 They grew from 5.2 million in 1995 to 23.4 million in 2015. Although the number
of criminal cases actually decreased by about ten percent over this twenty-year period, both
civil and administrative cases grew by over 500 percent. Rassmotrenie del i materialov po
I instantsii sudami obshchei iurisdiktsii razlichnykh urovenei po godam 1995-2007 gg. (on
file with author); Rassmotrenie del sudami obshchei iurisdiktsii po I instantsii, 2010-2015,
http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=3008.
7 Stenogramma "kruglogo stola" Komiteta po grazhdanskomu, ugolovnomu,
arbitrazhnomu i protsessual'nomu zakonodatel'stvu na temu: "Federal'nyi zakon '0
mediatsii - odin god pravoprimeneniia, perspektivy razvitiia zakonodatel'stva o
mediatsii." Zdanie Gosudarstvennoi Dumy, Moscow. May 14, 2012.
8 Spravka "0 praktike primeneniia sudami Federal'nogo zakona ot 26 iuliia 2010 g.,
No. 193-FZ, 'Ob al'temativnoi protsedure uregulirovaniia sprosov s uchastiem posrednika
(protsedure mediatsii)' za period s 2013 po 2014 god. Utverzhdena Prezidiumom
Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1 aprelia 2015 goda.
9 For an overview of the motivations for embracing mediation in the West, see
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. For a U.S.-specific analysis grounded in empirical
research, see Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An EmpiricalAssessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237 (1981). Mediation flourished in the Far East
as a way to maintain social harmony. See generally Stanley Lubman, Mao and Mediation:
489
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ameliorating judges' workload and improving the quality of litigants'
experiences.
10
Legal scholars served as the catalyst for the law on mediation. As I have
detailed elsewhere" a working group headed by Professor Elena Nosyreva of
Voronezh State University law faculty was created under the auspices of the
Moscow Chamber of Commerce. 12 They toiled in obscurity for many years,
circulating drafts based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Conciliation among themselves and publishing them in trade
journals. 3 The Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, first
took up the draft law in 2006, but it languished unexamined and was
withdrawn from consideration. With the backing of then-President Dmitri
Medvedev, a substantially revised draft was submitted to the legislature in
2010. The members of the original working group took issue with many of the
changes. Nosyreva commented that "it is unlikely to facilitate the use and
dissemination of mediation in Russia."' 4 After being introduced in March
2010, it was passed in July 2010, with an effective date of January 1, 2011 .15
In the words of Veniamin F. Iakovlev-who in addition to being an advisor to
Russian presidents since he stepped down as the chairman of the Higher
Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1284 (1967). Its
expansion in more recent years has been encouraged as a way to lessen the workload on
courts. In recent years, upwards of two-thirds of all civil and commercial disputes have
been resolved through mediation. Xiong Hao, Two Sides of Court Mediation in Today's
Southwest Grassroots China: An Empirical Study in T Court, Yunnan Province, 1 ASIAN
J.L. & SOC'Y 367, 368 (2014).
10 Bol'shova was realistic in her expectations, noting that "[miediation can never be a
panacea and can never save our courts from the huge volume of cases." Stenogramma,
supra note 7.
" See generally Kathryn Hendley, What If You Build It and No One Comes?: The
Introduction of Mediation to Russia, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 727 (2013).
12 The working group also included Bol'shova.
13 Proekt. Federal'nyi zakon, 0 primiritel'noi protsedure s uchastiem posrednika
(posrednichestve), TRETEISKII SUD no. 4, 2005, at 14; Proekt. Federal'nyi zakon, 0
primiritel'noi protsedure s uchastiem posrednika (posrednichestve), TRETEISKII SUD no. 5,
2005, at 6; Proekt. Federal'nyi zakon, 0 primiritel'noiprotsedure s uchastiem posrednika
(mediatsii), TRETEISKII SUD no. 5, 2006, at 14.
14 E.I. Nosyreva, Spetsial'noe pravovoe regulirovanie posrednichestva (analiz
zakonoproekta), TRETEISKII suD no. 2, 2010, at 39. For additional critiques of the new draft
by the Russian scholarly community, see O.V. Allakherdova, Kommentarii k
zakonoproektu, TRETEISKII SUD, no.2, 2010, at 62; D.L. Davydenko, Kommentarii na
zakonoproekty, vnesennye Prezidentom RF, TRETEISKII SuD no. 2, 2010, at 48; M.E.
Morozov, Otzyv na proekt Federal'nogo zakona "Ob al'ternativnoi protsedure
uregulrovaniia sporov s uchastiem posrednika (protsedure mediatsii)," TRETEISKII SUD
no. 2, 2010, at 56.
1" "Ob al'temativnoi", supra note 2.
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Arbitrazh Court16 in 2005, has been a champion for mediation-the law "was
born in great agony. You cannot imagine how much effort by many people it
took."' 7
A. How the Law is Supposed to Work
The law opens the door to mediation in most civil cases, regardless of
whether they are brought in the courts of general jurisdiction or the arbitrazh
courts. 18 Its use is forbidden in cases involving third parties or in collective
labor disputes. 9 It also prohibits its use in criminal or other cases of public
concern. This has been interpreted to preclude mediation in disputes with the
state.2°
In Russia, as elsewhere, settlement is distinguished from mediation. This
makes sense. Settlement generally involves the parties finding a compromise
on their own, whereas mediation assumes this has proven impossible and
contemplates bringing in a mediator to help the parties. Disputants are
permitted and encouraged to settle at every stage, including before coming to
court. Along similar lines, the language of the law would seem to open the
door to trying mediation both in the lead up to the lawsuit and after it has been
filed." But pretrial mediation is allowed only if it is contemplated in the
16 At the urging of President Putin, the Higher Arbitrazh Court was merged with the
Russian Supreme Court in 2014. The Supreme Court was reconstituted to include panels
devoted to hearing claims from lower level arbitrazh courts. See generally Sergei Zaikin,
Arbitrazhnyi Sud: Dannye udaleny. Chast' 1: Molchanie i sograsie, SRAVNITEL'NOE
KONSTITUTSIONNOE OBOZRENIE no. 3, 2015 at 54. For more on the post-merger Supreme
Court see Aleksandr N. Vereshchagin, Mezhdu Stsilloi VAS i Kharabdoi VS., VESTNIK
EKONOMICHESKOGO PRAVOSUDIIA ROSSIlSKOI FEDERATSII no. 10, 2015, at 15; Peter B.
Maggs et al., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (6th ed. 2015); Jane
Henderson, Developments in Russia, 21 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 229 (2015).
17 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
1 "Ob ai'ternativnoi", supra note 2, at art. 1. Arbitrazh courts hear economic disputes,
most of which involve legal entities. See, e.g., Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution:
The Transition in Russia from State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 93
(1998). The courts of general jurisdiction hear all other civil cases, as well as all criminal
cases. See, e.g., PETER I. SOLOMON JR. & TODD FOGLESONG, COURTS AND TRANSITION IN
RUSSIA: THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 183 (2000). Cases that raise questions
about the constitutionality of the underlying laws or regulations are handled by the Russian
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., ALEXEI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT IN RUSSIAN POLITICS 1990-2006 (2008).
19 "Ob al'ternativnoi", supra note 2, at pt. 5, art. 1.
20 P.M. Voronetskii, Nekotorye prichiny nepopuliarnosti instituta mediatsii v
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ROSSIISKAIA IUSTITSIIA, no. 3, 2016 at 62.
21 "Ob al'ternativnoi", supra note 2, at art. 7.
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agreement that establishes the parties' relationship.22 This is rarely found. As
a practical matter, therefore, mediation is possible only after a lawsuit has been
initiated. 23 When judges accept a case for trial, they send an order
(opredelenie) to the litigants detailing the time and place for the hearing and
laying out their rights and duties. Among those is the right to bypass the court
for mediation.24 When the parties appear before the judge, the procedural
codes obligate her to remind them of this option. If they are amenable, then
the case is stayed for up to sixty days while the parties work with a mediator.
If the parties are able to resolve their dispute, they emerge with a "mediation
agreement" (mediativnoe soglashenie) that is reviewed by the court. Judges do
not ory into the merits of the resolution; so long as it is within the bounds of
the law, they approve it, thereby terminating the lawsuit.26 If a resolution
proves elusive, even with the help of a mediator, then the parties return to court
and resume their adversarial stances.27 Much like mediation the world over,
the proceedings are deemed confidential. 28 The parties cannot rely on what
they learned to bolster their cases, nor can they call mediators as witnesses.29
B. The Use (or Nonuse) of the Law
Iaroslav B. Zhelobov, the chairman of the Pushkin district court in St.
Petersburg, speaks for the judicial corps generally when he argues that "from
the point of view of the judicial community, mediation is needed. 3° Iakovlev
buttresses these sentiments. Not only does he see value in the potential to
divert cases away from the courts, but he also believes that helping parties to
find a way through their problems creates more stable solutions. He recognizes
that leaving parties to their own devices can often devolve into screaming
22 The statutory provision stating that mediation "is carried out on the basis of an
agreement between the parties on the use of mediation" has been interpreted narrowly to
require a mandatory mediation clause. KOMMENTARIT K FEDERAL'NOMU ZAKONU "OB
AL'TERNATIVNOI PROTSEDURE UREGULIROVANJIA SPOROV S UCHASTIEM POSREDNIKA
(PROTSEDURE MEDIATSH)" 98 (S.K. Zagainova, and V.V. Iarkov, eds., 2011).
23 "Ob al'temativnoi" supra note 2, at art. 4.
24 GRAZHDANSKII PROTSESSUAL'NYI KODEKS RossnIsKoI FEDERATSII [hereinafter
GPK RF] ot 14 noiabria 2002 goda, No. 138-FZ, arts. 150, 172, available at
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons doc LAW_39570/.
251 d at art. 169.
26 "Ob al'ternativnoi" supra note 2, at art. 12; see generally Spravka, supra note 8.
27 GPK RF supra note 24, at art. 173.
28 "Ob al'ternativnoi" supra note 2, at arts. 3, 5; see generally A.K.C. Koo,
Confidentiality of Mediation Communications, 30 CIV. JUSTICE QUARTERLY 192 (2011).
29 GPK RF, supra note 24, at pt. 3 art. 69.
30 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
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matches, where neither side is truly listening. He sees mediation as a way of
"helping people to enter into negotiations and talk with each other normally in
human (chelovecheskii) language. And try to understand each other." He
describes this as a "high art" (velikoe iskusstvo).3 1
Litigants, on the other hand, have mostly given the cold shoulder to
mediation. Beginning in 2014, national-level data on the use of mediation has
been included in the annual statistical report on the activities of the courts of
general jurisdiction. As Table I documents, less than one tenth of a percent of
all civil cases were resolved via mediation. Mirroring Western experience,
litigants tend to be more open to trying this alternative approach when tussling
with those closest to them. Almost a quarter of all cases mediated involve
inter-familial disputes. When we look at the number of cases mediated as a
percentage of all similar cases, inheritance disputes, which also typically pit
family members against one another, emerge as being friendly to mediation.
In both categories of cases, just over 0.02 percent of disputes were resolved
through mediation. A similar level of usage is visible for consumer disputes.
Unlike family and inheritance squabbles, consumer claims involve parties
operating at arms' length. Some Russian retail establishments have begun
including mandatory mediation clauses in their form documents, which helps
explain the higher than average propensity to resort to mediation.
31 Id
32 Unfortunately, the available data do not reveal the number of cases in which the
parties availed themselves of mediation. As a result, we cannot know how often mediation
succeeds. Even fewer cases are resolved with the help of mediators at the arbitrazh courts.
According to the official statistics, only 29 of 1.15 million civil cases decided by these
courts in 2015 involved mediators. Otchet o rabote arbitrazhnykh sudov sub"ektov
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2015 godu, available at
http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=3423.
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Table 1: Use of Mediation in the Russian Courts of General Jurisdiction, 2014-
2015."3
Number of As percentage Number of As percentage As percentage
cases of all civil mediated of all cases in of all mediated
cases cases that category cases
Family law
2014 1,115,987 8.04 331 0.0296 24.81
2015 1,088,949 6.88 251 0.023 22.5
Labor
2014 569,583 4.11 91 0.016 6.82
2015 628,727 3.97 59 0.009 5.29
Inheritance
2014 110,826 0.8 25 0.023 1.87
2015 109,289 6.91 27 0.025 2.42
Housig
2014 2,935,516 21.16 137 0.005 10.27
2015 3,531,451 22.32 125 0.0035 11.21
Consumer
2014 394,658 2.84 108 0.027 8.1
2015 456,943 2.89 108 0.023 9.69
Tax
2014 2,807,179 20.2 0 0 0
2015 3,589,711 22.69 0 0 0
All cases
2014 13,872,685 1334 0.0096 100
2015 15,819,942 1115 0.007 100
These data do not break down mediation use by region or by courts within
regions. Russian scholarship occasionally provides a glimpse of this reality.
The limited data does suggest that the use of mediation is concentrated in a
few regions where local administrators have embraced it wholeheartedly.
Training judges helps. Judges who have received formal training on mediation
are more likely to encourage parties to try it.34 In several regions, such as St.
31 Otchet o rabote sudov obshchei iurisdiktsii o rasmotrenii grazhdanskikh del po
pervoi instantsii za 12 mesiatsev 2015 [hereinafter Otchet 2015],
http://www.cdep.rulindex.php?id=79&item=3417; Otchet o rabote sudov obshchei
iurisdiktsii o rasmotrenii grazhdanskikh del po pervoi instantsii za 12 mesiatsev 2014
[hereinafter Otchet 2014], http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=2884.
34 In 2013, 1 collaborated with staff members of the Higher Arbitrazh Court to survey
trial-level arbitrazh judges about their attitudes and behavior regarding mediation.
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Petersburg, Voronezh, Ekaterinburg, and Pskov, mediation centers have been
created and have secured funding to pay the costs of mediation for interested
litigants as part of limited-time pilot projects.35 In these regions (as well as
several others), mediators are available in the courthouse, thereby eliminating
the need for litigants to seek them out independently. All of these incentives
have boosted the use of mediation, but even with them, very few parties have
been willing to try it. For example, in the Pushkin district court of St.
Petersburg, where the chairman is an unabashed cheerleader for mediation,
only 52 cases were mediated from October 2011 to October 2012.36 This
accounted for less than 2 percent of its 2012 civil caseload.37 Mediation was
successful in 40 of these cases (77 percent).38 The bulk of these cases were
family disputes (68 percent). The remainder were fairly evenly divided
between labor disputes and consumer claims. Judges reported that even when
mediation failed to produce concrete results, they nonetheless observed
behavioral changes. Parties who had tried mediation were more willing to
listen to each other and to restrain their emotions in court. More importantly,
they were better able to clearly formulate their arguments which allowed their
cases to proceed more quickly.39 Such comments echo the observations of
Western judges.40
Vasilii Nechaev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, argues
in favor of parties, themselves, resolving disputes. He bemoans the
"adversarial nature of trials. There is always a dissatisfied party. Practice
shows that if a decision is reached through mediation, then, as a rule, the
Regression analysis confirms that having been through training was a significant predictor
of openness to recommending mediation. So too was being acquainted with mediators.
Kathryn Hendley, Judges as Gatekeepers in Mediation: The Russian Case, 16 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 423, 449, 454 (2015); see also Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at
117-18.
" See generally Hendley, supra note 11. This use of experimental programs to spur
interest in mediation is similar to efforts in the U.S. in the 1970s. See, e.g., McEwen &
Maiman, supra note 9, at 242.
36 M.A Alekseeva, "Praktika utverzhdeniia mediativnykh soglashenii v sudakh
obshchei iurisdiktsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (n.d.), availible at
buryatia.arbitr.ru/files/doc/Alekseeva.docx.
" For the caseload data for the Pushkin district court, see Otchet o rabote sudov
obshchei iurisdiktsii po rassmotreniiu grazhdanskikh del po pervoi instantsii za 12
mesiatsev 2012 g., available at
http://psh.spb.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=docum sud&id=269.
38 Alekseeva, supra note 36.
39 Id.
40 Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on
the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 565,
603-04 (1997).
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parties will respect it." 4 1 Along similar lines, Zhelobov told of a family
transformed through their participation in mediation. He strong-armed former
spouses into trying mediation in a contentious child custody case in which the
husband had been stalking his ex-wife. With the help of the mediator, they
came to better understand each other's positions and found a mutually
acceptable resolution. The judge said that, even though they remained
divorced, he sometimes sees them walking together with their children near
his courthouse in St. Petersburg.42 According to those who have tracked
mediated cases, no one has yet recanted an agreement made through mediation
or tried to reopen the dispute.43
II. RUSSIAN SCHOLARS' EXPLANATIONS FOR THE NONUSE OF
MEDIATION
The failure of Russian litigants to use mediation has not gone unnoticed
by the Russian scholarly community. Much ink has been spilt in an effort to
explain the failure of mediation to take hold.
A. Flaws in the Legislation
Given its civil law legal heritage, Russian legal scholars tend to focus on
the letter of the law. As one analyst cogently argued: "The essential
shortcomings of the legal regime constitute the basic explanation for the
unpopularity of mediation today." 4 Others agree.45 Of course, no law is ever
perfect. Russia's mediation law is no exception.
A critique that has consistently dogged the law is its terminology.4 6 There
are several words that can be used for mediation. The somewhat awkward title
given to the law reflects an effort at compromise: "On an alternative procedure
41 Vasil'eva, supra note 3. At a 2015 Saratov round-table, a local judge told of a
dispute over property rights that was resolved in a single day with the help of a mediator.
The parties then enforced the decision themselves; the court did not have to take any action.
Kruglyi stol "Mediatsiia: Perspektivy razvitiia." Held at Saratov Oblast Court on May 22,
2015, http://oblsud.sar.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=press dep&op=l&did=809. U.S.-
based research likewise shows fewer problems with compliance when the parties have
mediated their dispute. See, e.g., McEwen & Maiman, supra note 9, at 241.
42 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
4' Kruglyi stol, supra note 41; Alekseeva, supra note 36; Spravka, supra note 8.
" See generally Voronetskii, supra note 20.
41 See, e.g., Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 122-25; Spravka, supra note 8;
Tiul'kanov, supra note 5.
46 E.I. Nosyreva & I.A. Sternin, 'Posrednichestvo' ili 'mediatsiia': k voprosu o
terminologii, TRETEISKII SUD, no. 1, 2007, at 9-14; Tiul'kanov, supra note 5, at 35.
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for regulating disputes with the use of a posrednik (the procedure of
mediatsii)." The first italicized word can be translated as intermediary,
mediator, or go-between.47 The second is translated as mediation. Each carries
its own baggage. Posrednik is a longstanding Russian word. It was the term
used to describe individuals (often thugs) who collected debts from
recalcitrant customers in the 1990s. For many Russians, its pejorative
connotation lingers on. The drafters of the law tried to make a fresh start by
using the English cognate-mediatsii-as a parenthetical explanation. But this
is a new word that is completely unfamiliar to Russians. Not surprisingly, there
is no entry for mediatsii in dictionaries that predate the law.48 It is also absent
from 2016 dictionaries. 49 By contrast, posrednik is included in both
dictionaries.
Many scholars believe that mediatsii is off-putting and confusing to
ordinary Russians.5" Given the hostility of Putin's regime toward the West,
and the United States in particular, its English heritage is not helpful. Even
after the law was passed, Iakovlev proposed substitutingprimiritel' .5 The root
for this word comes from the verb for conciliating or settling-primirit'.
Hence, the technical translation would be a conciliator. Clearly this only opens
yet another can of worms by potentially conflating mediation with settlement.
The legislators' choice to limit mediation to relatively simple civil cases
is a commonly voiced criticism. Scholars uniformly advocate for allowing
mediation in multi-party civil cases as well as criminal and administrative
cases. They point out that mediation was used successfully in criminal cases
in the 2008 St. Petersburg experiment with mediation that predated the law.52
The limited legislative history of the law provides no clues as to why
legislators did not include criminal cases. Perhaps they were concerned about
" See A. 1. Smirnitsky, COMPREHENSIVE RUSSIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (O.S.
Akhmanova eds. 27th ed. 2006). Posrednik serves as the root for posrednichestvo, which
can be translated as mediation.
48 See, e.g., Sovremennyi tolkovyi slovar' russkogo iazyka (S.A. Kuznetsov, ed.,
2001).
" See, e.g., Bol'shoi universal'nyi slovar' russkogo iazyka (V.V. Morkovkin et al.
eds., 2016).
'0 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
51 Id.
52 The St. Petersburg pilot program operated for three years (2008-2011). About half
of the 138 cases that were mediated were criminal. Without exception, these were chastnoe
obvinenie, a kind of private prosecution, involving minor injuries that the police and
prosecutors have declined to pursue. In their stead, the victim serves as a private
prosecutor. Hendley, supra note 11, at 748. See generally A.S. Krasnopevtsev, Opyt
primeneniia mediatsii v mirovykh sudakh Sankt-Petersburga, TRETEISKII SUD, no. 3, 2011
at 144-45.
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the inevitable power differential between criminal defendants and prosecutors.
This might also explain why they forbade mediation in cases involving the
state. Yet top state officials are open to mediation. For example, the head of
the federal tax service believes that mediation could be "extremely useful" in
handling disputes with taxpayers.53
Scholars also fault the law for a lack of clarity on who can serve as a
mediator. The requirements under the law are threefold: (1) at least 25 years
of age; (2) university degree; and (3) training as a mediator. 4 The scholarly
literature focuses largely on the third prong. There seems to be a yearning for
more specificity as to the approach and content of the training. At present, a
number of mediation centers have established training programs and each
pursues its own path. At a public round-table, several judges expressed
concern over the lack of regulation, suggesting that some sort of accreditation
process for mediators would be welcome.55
Another sticky issue is whether public officials---especially judges-
should serve as mediators.56 The law establishes a default rule prohibiting
state officials from serving as mediators, though it opens the door to
exceptions.57 A draft law that would create such an exception for retired judges
and other courthouse personnel was floated in 2012, but came to naught.
58
Russian judges are keen to carve out this exception, pointing to the success in
Belarus and Japan ofjudicial mediators.59 In support, they point to the Russian
past. Nineteenth-century Russian justices of the peace were encouraged to
conciliate among litigants.60 My own observational research in Russian courts
documents that judges frequently intercede with parties to help them find
" Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 140.
14 "Ob al'ternativnoi" supra note 2, at art. 16.
55 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
56 In China, judges serve as both mediators and decision-makers. See Hao, supra note
9; Chen Yongzhu, The Judge as Mediator in China and its Reform: A Problem in Chinese
Civil Justice, 10 J. COMP. L. 106, 106-07, 109-12 (2015). Some have framed the official
push for mediation over courts as a rejection of formal institutions. See, e.g., Carl P.
Minzer, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. CoMp. L. 935, 951 (2011). But non-court-
based community mediation also flourishes. See generally Ahahla Ali, The Jurisprudence
of Responsive Mediation: An Empirical Examination of Chinese Peoples' Mediation in
Action, 45 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 227 (2013); We Yuning, People's
Mediation Enters the 21st Century, 10 J. COMP. L. 25 (2015).
51 "Ob al'ternativnoi" supra note 2, at pt. 5, art. 15.
58 Hendley, supra note 11, at 750-51.
" Irina Reshetnikova, Skonit, k miru, ROS. GAZ. (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://rg.n/2013/11/05/primirenie.
60 Stenogramma, supra note 7; Joan Neuberger, Popular Legal Cultures: The St.
Petersburg Mirovoi Sud, in RUSSIA'S GREAT REFORMS, 1855-1881, 132-46 (Ben Eklof et
al. eds., 1994).
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mutually acceptable compromises. 6 1 In doing so, they skirt the line between
judge and mediator, though both allow them to maintain their neutrality.
Scholars actively debate the mechanics of paying for mediation. The law
requires the disputants to cover the costs of mediation. 62 In an effort to
stimulate use, the privately-funded pilot programs in St. Petersburg,
Ekaterinburg, Rostov, and Pskov shouldered this burden, rendering mediation
free, at least from a financial perspective. Although the take-up rate was lower
than had been hoped, more litigants were willing to try mediation under these
conditions, leading some commentators to advocate shifting the costs of
mediation onto the state.63 Alternatively, they recommend returning some
portion of the filing fees (gosposhlina) to parties who conclude mediation
agreements. 64 Doing so would make it analogous to the practice for
settlements, following which half of the gosposhlina paid is returned as an
informal quid pro quo for liberating the court from the obligation to resolve
the dispute on its merits.6 5 An alternative proposal would subsidize the costs
for certain kinds of cases or parties.
66
B. Institutional Incentives
Western experience suggests that disputants turn to mediation when the
costs of litigation grow overwhelming. These costs are measured not just in
terms of money, but also in terms of time and emotional energy. Courts in
Western Europe and the United States are plagued by delays.67 The ever-
increasing cost of retaining counsel likewise discourages the disgruntled from
pursuing lawsuits. The situation is remarkably different in Russia. The
procedural rules are straightforward, allowing litigants to forego legal
representation if desired.6" Moreover, the procedural codes establish clear
61 Kathryn Hendley, Assessing the Role of the Justice-of-the-Peace Courts in the
Russian Judicial System, 37 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 377, 390 (2012).
62 "Ob al'ternativnoi" supra note 2, at art. 10.
63 Vasil'eva, supra note 3.
64 Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 138.
6 5 NALOGYOVYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII CHAST' 2 ot 5 avgusta 2000, No. 117-
FZ, art. 333.40, available at http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons doc LAW 28165/;
ARBITRAZHNYI PROTSESSUAL'NYI KODEKS RossIISKOI FEDERATSII ot 27 iuliia 2002, No.
95-FZ, art. 141, pt. 7 [hereinafter APK RF], available at
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons docLAW_37800/.
66 Vasil'eva, supra note 3.
67 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down the Primrose Path with
Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 981, 982-84 (2012).
68 Hendley, supra note 11, at 731.
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deadlines for resolving cases.69 Judges' ability to live within these constraints
is a key assessment factor. As a result, violations are few.7" Gosposhlina has
been kept low as a way of ensuring widespread access to justice.7' Reflecting
on the impact of these institutional incentives on the use of mediation, Irina V.
Reshetnikova, the influential chairman of the Ural okrug cassation arbitrazh
court, commented: "The speed with which Russian courts resolve cases is the
envy of all of Europe: from ten days to three months. In fact, our [judicial]
processes are both cheap and quick. In the eyes of the public, this eliminates
the need for mediation. 7 2
An insufficient supply of qualified mediators has also been cited by
several scholars as a deterrent to the use of mediation.73 Though training
centers have sprung up, there is little doubt that the system could not cope if
litigants began to opt for mediation routinely. But to claim that a shortfall in
mediators lies at the root of the nonuse of mediation would seem to put the
cart before the horse. After all, as one group of Moscow scholars
acknowledged, "most [Russian] citizens know nothing about mediation."74
C. Legal Culture
Although Russian scholars' prescriptions for spurring greater use of
mediation rely primarily on institutional reforms, they occasionally give a nod
to less concrete factors. Yakovlev, in particular, has argued that changing the
atmosphere in society is also important.75 Others have chimed in. Some point
to the reluctance of litigants to take responsibility for their disputes, noting that
they prefer to wait for the judge to render her decision. 76 Their disinclination
69 Most civil cases are required to be resolved within two months of the filing date.
GPK RF, supra note 24, at art. 154.
70 The deadlines were violated in less than 1.5 percent of all civil claims in 2014 and
2015. Otchet 2015, supra note 33; Otchet 2014, supra note 33.
7" See Kathryn Hendley, Too Much of a Good Thing? Assessing Access to Civil Justice
in Russia, 72 SLAVIC REv. 802 (2013) (on the politics behind low filing fees).
72 Reshetnikova, supra note 59. See also Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 114
(which similarly argues that the fact that Russian courts are "rather inexpensive" and
"rather quick and accessible" undercuts the demand for mediation).
" See generally Spravka, supra note 8; Tiul'kanov, supra note 5, at 36; S.K.
ZAIGANOVA ET. AL., MEDLATSIIA V NOTARIAL'NOI DEIATEL'NOSTI (2012).
14 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
71 Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 115; Stenogramma, supra note 7.
76 Judges share this view. In my 2013 survey of arbitrazh judges, over half (51
percent) disagreed with the statement: "Litigants in Russia are prepared to participate
actively in the resolution of their disputes." Hendley, supra note 34.
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to settle buttresses this argument.7 7 According to the scholarly literature, an
openness to settling is generally viewed as a sign of weakness. 78 They argue
that proposing mediation would likewise be seen as waving the white flag of
surrender.
III. METHODOLOGY: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE Focus GROUPS
The voices of actual litigants are notably absent from Russian scholars'
analysis. Studying non-events, such as the nonuse of mediation, is never
easy. 7' One approach might have been to haunt the halls of Russian
courthouses, querying litigants about their choices. My approach is different.
With the help of Russian colleagues, I organized nine focus groups in 2014
that brought ordinary Russians together to discuss their reviews on resolving
disputes, with an emphasis on their openness to alternative dispute resolution.
They were divided equally between Moscow, Voronezh, and Novosibirsk.
These sites were chosen strategically. Each has a different profile regarding
mediation. Voronezh is the home base for Elena Nosyreva who, as I noted
earlier, chaired the working group that drafted the 2010 law on mediation. She
has established a center at Voronezh State University that is active in
mediating disputes and training mediators. Novosibirsk, by contrast, has no
such center. Moscow lies somewhere in the middle. It is home to mediation
activists and mediation centers, but is not known for this.
Hypothesizing that attitudes towards dispute resolution would be colored
by prior court experience, I divided the groups accordingly. In each locale, one
group was composed of court veterans, another was composed of those who
had never been to court, and the third was mixed. Almost all of those with
experience had been through civil processes. 80 Most (87%) had been the
" In 2014 and 2015, less than six percent of all civil cases were terminated short of a
decision, a categorization that includes settlements as well as those who decide not to
proceed for other reasons. Otchet 2014, supra note 33; Otchet 2015, supra note 33. On the
reasons behind Russians' reluctance to settle, see Hendley, supra note 71, at 823.
78 Shamlikashvili et al., supra note 4, at 115; Stenogramma, supra note 7.
79See generally KATHRYN HENDLEY, EVERYDAY LAW IN RuSSIA (2017); Rebecca
Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of
Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS, 112 (Pascoe Pleasance et
al., eds., 2007).
" The only exception was Vera, a 40-year-old Muscovite who worked in a technical
capacity at a university, who had been the victim of a crime. She represented her own
interests at the subsequent trial. Like most European countries (e.g., Bron McKillop,
Anatomy of a French Murder Case, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 527 (1997)), victims are parties to
criminal cases in Russia, where they can weigh in on the treatment of the defendant and
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instigators of their court cases. Reflecting the docket of Russian courts, the
most common types of cases were housing (33%) and family (27%) disputes,
with cases involving labor claims, personal injury, business problems, and
debt collection also represented.
The focus groups were held in the evenings and on weekends because
most of the participants had full-time jobs. They lasted about two hours. Each
group included 8-12 participants. 8' An effort was made to ensure diversity in
terms of gender, employment, and education. The participants were almost
evenly divided by gender with 46 men and 45 women. Their ages ranged from
23 to 66, with an average age of 41. From a financial point of view, the
participants were comfortable. Two-thirds said that they could easily afford
big-ticket items, such as refrigerators and televisions, while the remainder said
that such purchases would be a struggle for them, but that they had no trouble
covering their daily expenses.
The discussions centered on three hypothetical scenarios that posed
mundane problems that could, but need not, be solved through litigation. Cards
on which the details were printed were distributed and participants were given
time to study them. Using these stylized fact patterns put everyone on the same
page. Participants were encouraged to share their own experiences. Many had
endured similar problems (although they were not recruited on this basis) and
related their reactions to them.
The first problem involved a recently purchased cell phone that had
stopped working. 2 The second posited a residential water leak.83 The third
seek civil damages. PETER MAGGS ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RuSSiAN
FEDERATION (6th ed. 2015).
81 The names of the participants have been changed to protect their anonymity.
82 lrina lvanovna, 44-year-old teacher, bought a new cell phone in the "Evroset'" store
near the school where she teaches. She is not tech savvy. Previously, she had a very basic
mobile phone, which she lost. The salesman persuaded her to buy a smartphone for $150,
assuring her that if problems arose, she could easily trade the phone for a new one. He also
convinced her to buy a two-year extended warranty for $50. Two weeks after the purchase,
her phone stopped working. When she brought it back to the store, she was told that she
would have to buy a new phone. The manager explained that the problem with her phone
arose due to improper use, invalidating the warranty.
83 Boris Mikhailovich, a 35 year-old doctor, lives in two-room apartment on the
second floor of a five-story building which he had inherited from his parents. He lives with
his wife and 8-year old son. One night Boris was awoken by what sounded like rain in his
apartment. He investigated and discovered that water was leaking from the ceiling in his
kitchen. He went upstairs, but no one was home in the apartment above him. He called the
management company. They sent a representative, who opened the third floor apartment
and discovered that the water had been left running. By the time the leak was stopped, the
wallpaper and parquet flooring in the kitchen had been badly damaged. The owner of the
third floor apartment refused to pay for the repairs.
[Vol. 32:3 20171
RESISTANCE, INDIFFERENCE OR IGNORANCE?
explored a sticky inheritance dispute. 84 The goal was to increase the
complexity of the problem as the discussions proceeded, in terms of both
substance and emotion. As she worked through the scenarios, the moderator 5
periodically asked the participants whether bringing in a third party might be
helpful.
I have elsewhere analyzed the participants' reactions to these problems,
looking at their propensity to take their claims to court.8 6 In this article, I
explore their attitudes towards the possibility of resolving them with the help
of neutral third parties. I also analyze their reactions to the idea of mediation
more generally.
IV. ORDINARY RUSSIANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS MEDIATION:
INSIGHTS FROM THE FOCUS GROUPS
A. Lack of Knowledge
The most striking finding that emerges from the focus groups is the
profound lack of popular knowledge of mediation. Even though over 60
percent of the participants had court experience, not a single person was aware
that they could have opted for mediation.87 This reality upends my initial
hypothesis that having court experience would matter because it would bring
a familiarity with mediation. Both neophytes and court veterans were equally
ignorant. It also confirms Russian scholars' intuition that the unfamiliarity
with mediation constitutes a significant constraint on popular use.
84 Daria Nikolaevna is a 20-year old secretary. She spent her summers in the
countryside at her grandparents' summer house (dacha). Her own parents died tragically
when she was young, so her grandparents brought her up. In addition to her father, they
had two other children, each of whom had a child. None of them lives nearby, and so have
not recently visited the dacha. Her grandmother died a few months ago. Her aunts and
uncles and cousins are keen to sell the dacha. It is located near a river and real estate
developers have already bought up adjacent properties. Daria is determined to keep it.
Although she does not yet have children, she wants the dacha to be there when she has a
family.
85 The moderator was a Russian social scientist with extensive experience leading
focus groups.
86 Kathryn Hendley, To Go To Court or Not? The Evolution of Disputes in Russia, in
A SOCIOLOGY OF JUSTICE IN RussIA (Marina Kurkchiyan &Agnieszka Kubald
eds.)(forthcoming 2017).
87 When the idea of mediation was raised by the moderator, a few participants in each
locale indicated an awareness of the process thanks to a television program, "Before The
Court" (Do suda), that focuses on resolving disputes before they get to court with the help
of neutral third parties. The participants had no idea that a similar service existed in reality.
DO SUDA (BEFORE THE COURT), (NTV 2010-).
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Court veterans' obliviousness reveals that judges are either failing to
inform them about their right to mediate or are doing so ineffectively." As I
noted earlier, the procedural codes require judges to educate litigants on this
score, both orally and in writing. But the written notification is far from
conspicuous. It is buried in a sea of legalese in a small font on the back side of
the document that notifies parties of the time and place of their hearing. My
observational research in Russian courts reveals that judges' recitations of
parties' rights and duties are often rendered in a rapid monotone that leaves
litigants more confused than educated. 89 Few ask clarifying questions,
preferring to let the unfamiliar language wash over them.
The focus group participants were not surprised or angered by this gap in
their knowledge of the Russian legal environment. Much like the participants
in my earlier Russian focus groups, 90 they cheerfully described themselves as
88 In 2010, the Moscow-based Institute of Law and Public Policy undertook a study
that monitored the activities of justice-of-the-peace courts in Penn krai and Leningrad
oblast. L. 0. Ivanova, Predlozheniia po povysheniiu dostupnosti pravosudiia dlia
maloimushchikh i sotsial 'no nezashchishchennykh grazhdan-uchastnikov grazhdanskogo
protsessa, (000 "Informpoligraf', Moscow, 2011); V. M. Voronkov & L. V. Ezhova,
Provedenie monitoringa sudebnykh zasedanii mirovykh sudei i oprosov uchastnikov
sudebnykh protsessov: Metologiia, instrumentarii, protsedury realizatsii i kontrolia
(Moscow: 000 "Imformpoligraf," 2010). Trained monitors observed over nine hundred
civil cases in each locale, paying close attention to the extent to which justices of the peace
lived up to their legal obligations. Their study predated the introduction of mediation, but
did explore the propensity ofjudges to tell parties of their right to settle, which is analogous
to mediation. They found that, while these judges complied with most procedural
requirements, they explained the settlement process in less than 15 percent of the
monitored cases. Olga Sidorovich, Proekt: Povyshenie dostupnosti pravosudiia dlia
maloimushchikh i sotsial 'no nezashchishchennykh grupp naseleniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii,
presentation at round-table held in St. Petersburg, Russia (June 30, 2011).
89 The experiences of the court veterans among the focus group participants varied.
Tatiana, a 29-year-old Novosibirsk manicurist who went to court in the aftermath of an
auto accident, was dismissive of her judge's interest in promoting a settlement. She
explained: "Do you know how a court hearing proceeds? 'Defendant, plaintiff, what
complaints do you have against each other?... Maybe you can amicably settle this
somehow. Go into the corridor-I'll give you five minutes-you can negotiate, then come
back in and give me your answer.' That's it. That's how it works in court." By contrast,
Irina, a member of the same focus group who was 49 years old and worked as a pension
department official, reported a different experience. She felt that her judge had been very
encouraging of a settlement in the case she brought against her bank. For a broader
overview of how Russian judges treat litigants, see Hendley, supra note 86.
9 See Kathryn Hendley, Resolving Problems Among Neighbors in Post-Soviet Russia:
Uncovering the Law of the Pod"ezd, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 388 (2011). See also
Hendley, supra note 86.
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"legally illiterate."91 Their reactions to learning of mediation were varied.
Non-Moscow participants assumed that it was available only in the capital.92
Voronezh residents were uniformly surprised to find out that they had a well-
respected and centrally located mediation center. Several assumed that the
failure of news to spread meant that it was not helpful. As Nadia, a 33-year-
old Voronezh doctor put it: "It seems to me that there must be few positive
results [from mediation] because if the pluses outweighed the minuses, then I
think information about it would have been shared more widely." All
participants agreed that "word of mouth" (serefannoe radio) would be the
most effective way to stimulate knowledge and use.
Much as the legal experts predicted, the focus group members were
flummoxed by the terminology of the law. No one had positive associations
with the wordposrednik. Vladimir, a 45-year-old Muscovite, spoke plainly on
this score: "Who are these posredniki? We all know who they are. These are
the bandits from the 1990s who would arrive and announce: 'You are going to
pay and we will provide a roof (krysha).'93 They then went to others and said:
'You can't do business here because this is our territory."' This understanding
of a posrednik as a goon or enforcer was consistent across the focus groups,
raising doubts as to whether the word can be rehabilitated and repurposed.
Mediator, by contrast, had no negative connotations, but was simply unknown
to the participants. Many of them correctly surmised that it was a foreign word,
which was a mark against it. In time, it may come to be part of the popular
vernacular. No one brought up primiritel', Iakovlev's suggestion as a
substitute for these contested terms, suggesting that it was also a non-starter.
B. Critiques of the Law
Needless to say, none of the participants had read the law. The moderator
explained its terms in broad strokes. Their biggest criticism was one that was
91 Anna, a 66-year-old self-described consultant from Voronezh, spoke for many when
she said: "People aren't legally literate. We don't fully understand our rights."
92 Maria, a 54-year-old Voronezh technician, commented that, "Probably this exists
in Moscow. We don't yet have it."
" Krysha is the Russian slang word for protection. "Since the Soviet Union collapsed,
krysha refers to protection against ordinary criminals and 'unprofessional' racketeers,
unruly business partners, and competitors." FEDERICO VARESE, THE RUSSIAN MAFIA:
PRIVATE PROTECTION IN A NEW MARKET ECONOMY 59 (2001). See also VADIM VOLKOV,
VIOLENT ENTREPRENEURS: THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN CAPITALISM
(2002). In more recent years, the need for kryshi has diminished as Russian businesses
have turned to more sophisticated and less violent methods of imposing their will on others,
such as corporate raiding. See generally Thomas Firestone, Criminal Corporate Raiding
in Russia, 42 INT'L LAWYER 1207 (2008).
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absent from the scholarly literature. To a person, they could not understand
why the law authorized mediation only after a lawsuit had been filed. Julia, a
34-year-old Voronezh accountant, succinctly expressed the views of her
colleagues when she commented: "Well, then, what's the point?" They argued
that mediation would make more sense before disputes were brought to the
courts. In their view, filing a lawsuit tended to harden the parties' positions,
complicating compromise. As Aleksei, a 28-year-old Moscow bank manager
commented: "the mentality of those who litigate-on principle, they don't
want to talk...; they're not interested."
Unlike the scholars, who are aware of the battles and compromises that
lay behind the law, the focus group participants came to mediation with fresh
eyes. They questioned its institutional structure, which scholars accepted as a
given. The participants' first reaction was that the moment for mediation has
passed once the lawsuit has been filed. Their logic is compelling, but falls
victim to political realities. Had legislators opted for this more informal
structure, it would have opened a Pandora's Box of problems of enforcement.
In its current form, judges act as the guarantors of the process; they will not
endorse a mediation agreement that violates the law. Moreover, a court-
endorsed mediation agreement has the same legal force as a judicial opinion,
allowing parties to seek a court order (ispolnitel'nyi list) without having to
return to the merits of the case.
C. Need for Mediation
But the participants' critiques go deeper. They are generally satisfied with
the court as the default venue to resolve vexing problems and are dubious as
to the need for mediation. Some-mostly court veterans-saw the potential
for mediation to ease the burden on courts. They recognized that mundane
cases could be diverted to mediation. But the majority of participants were
more resistant to the charms of mediation. Maksim, a 36-year-old Voronezh
taxi driver, described it as "completely superfluous." David, a 32-year-old
dispatcher at a Moscow transportation company, expressed a commonly felt
frustration: "This is simply puzzling. So, this mediator gets involved at the
court. But the trial is already underway and I retained a lawyer (advokat) from
the outset, to whom I already paid money and signed a contract so that I can
win the case. So why is [mediation] needed? If I already have an advokat?"94
9 Like many European countries, Russia has a divided bar. Advokaty tend to be
litigators; they are the only subunit within the Russian legal profession that has an entry
exam akin to a U.S. bar exam. Only advokaty can represent criminal defendants, but there
are no restrictions on who Russians can hire to represent them in other types of cases.
Lawyers who regularly go to court, but who have not passed the exam to become an
506
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David's comment reveals two sources for this skepticism, namely the cost and
the function of mediators.
D. Cost of Mediation
Cost was the most common objection to mediation raised by the focus
group participants. As a rule, they recoiled at the prospect of having to pay for
mediators' services. The response of Klavdia, a 41-year-old Moscow
insurance agent, was telling. She said: "We already paid for the complaint, we
already showed up in court and paid for the case. Is this free?"95 There was a
consensus that the filing fees (gosposhlina) ought to cover any and all
expenses related to the dispute. When the moderator explained that the
services of mediators was not included, the displeasure was palpable. The
participants saw this as paying twice for the same service. 96 Even more
troubling to them was the uncertainty as to the cost (which stands in contrast
to gosposhlina, which is calculated as a percentage of the amount sought)..
Once reconciled to paying mediators, participants argued in favor of a
results-based payment scheme. Put more bluntly, they believe that mediators
should only be paid if they are successful in bringing the parties together,
thereby averting lawsuits. As Mikhail, a 51-year-old Voronezh engineer, put
it: "It's ok if it's expensive, but there should be a small advance payment. The
remainder should come from the person at fault."
E. Function of Mediation and Mediators
Mikhail's comment illustrates his lack of understanding of the mediation
process. He sees it as being a battle where someone emerges as victorious. But
the beauty of mediation is that it allows parties to abandon this construct and
work through their problem collaboratively. Egor, a 65-year-old Muscovite
who, as the chairman of a housing committee, was an experienced litigator,
resisted the idea that a mutually acceptable solution could emerge through
mediation. He remarked: "This simply couldn't happen-that both sides are
advokat are referred to as iuristy. See generally PAMELA A. JORDAN, DEFENDING RIGHTS
IN RUSSIA: LAWYERS, THE STATE, AND LEGAL REFORMS IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA (2005).
9' In every location, several participants pushed back against free mediation services.
They worried that such services might have hidden costs that reveal themselves at an
inconvenient moment.
96 Others saw mediators as duplicating the function of their lawyers. Olga, a 39-year-
old Muscovite who managed an advertising agency, asked: "And who will gather and
submit the documents to the court? The posrednik or the advokat? Do you end up having
to pay both a posrednik and an advokat?"
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content." Although a few participants recognized that the non-adversarial
nature of mediation potentially allowed disputants to maintain a cordial
relationship,97 most shared the confusion of Mikhail and Egor. Many saw the
mediator as replicating the function of their lawyer, as David's earlier remark
reflects. For example, when the idea of asking a third party to intercede in a
dispute was first raised by the moderator in the Moscow group with court
experience, Nadezhda, a 48-year-old housewife responded with several
questions: "When you say intermediary (posrednik), do you have in mind an
advokat?...An advokat is, in principle, aposrednik."
She and her fellow participants had trouble trusting in the neutrality of any
third party. They were suspicious that he would inevitably favor one of the
parties. Indeed, Evgeniia, a 42-year-old Novosibirsk municipal official,
dismissed the very idea as a "fairy tale." To some extent, their misgivings tap
into their view of human nature, which has been colored by Russia's long
struggle with corruption. Many saw judges as inherently venal and assumed
that the same would be true of mediators.9" Nadezhda summed up this
position: "Someone is paid off and then you are left with nothing." The
participants struggled to wrap their minds around the role of mediators; their
instinct was to put them into the familiar boxes of decision-makers or lawyers.
They could not see that the very fact that a mediator lacks a dog in the fight
ought to ensure his neutrality and ought to eliminate any incentive for under-
the-table payoffs.99
" Echoing the Western literature, these participants saw a role for mediation in
disputes among family members or in other situations where the parties needed to preserve
their relationships.
" In a 2010 survey of Russians on their attitudes towards the courts fielded by the
Levada Center, over half of the respondents believed that judges accept bribes very often
or somewhat often. It is worth noting that 31 percent of respondents took no position on
this question. Kathryn Hendley, Justice in Moscow?, 32 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 491 (2016).
Bol'shova has argued that the evidence ofjudicial corruption is weak. She points to a price
list for bribes published by a Russian magazine, Sliianie i pogoloshchenie. When she
confronted the magazine's editor, she learned that the report was based on what one babka
(a contemptuous term for an older woman) had heard from an acquaintance. Moreover, the
report was about payments made to lawyers; it did not document whether these payments
were forwarded to judges. Stenogramma, supra note 7.
" In the 2012 round-table discussion of mediation, Iakovlev acknowledges the "dense
prejudices" of the public about judicial corruption. He concedes that judges have a
tendency to side with those who have more power, which is often judged in monetary
terms, especially when they have been paid to do so. But because mediators are not
authorized to resolve disputes, he believes this eliminates the possibility of corruption.
When referring to mediators, he uses primiritel', which can be defined as a conciliator.
Stenogramma, supra note 7.
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The focus group participants' bewilderment over the role of mediators led
them to wonder who could and should serve as a mediator. No consensus
emerged. Some thought legal training was critical, while others felt that
training as a psychologist would be useful. 0 Several advocated for
psychologists with legal education, though presumably these are few and far
between. In most groups, the discussion quickly moved away from formal
educational prerequisites to the personal qualities that a mediator ought to
have. Harkening back to the concerns over corruption, all agreed on the need
to be able to stand up to intimidation. Putting it more colorfully, Fedor, a 25-
year-old Novosibirsk worker, cautioned against having a "meek dandelion"
serve as a mediator. Just as important was an ability to work with people of all
stripes10' and to convince them to shift their positions. Many were skeptical
that a mediator could effect a settlement. They pointed out that people who
end up in court tend to be intransigent. lulia summarized this position
regarding the second scenario dealing with a home repair: "If I don't agree to
an amount, then no one can force me. If I decide on 5,000 rubles and they
propose 7,000, I will tell them to get lost.... They'll tell me to take it to court.
The situation will remain conflictual." Others questioned whether a mediator
would be able to win the confidence of the parties. Anna said that many of her
neighbors would simply "shut the door in your face and refuse to talk." Not
everyone was so dismissive. Some saw the potential value to having a neutral
third party who can break down the barriers between the parties. But everyone
agreed that the impetus for mediation would have to come from the disputants.
The consensus was that forcing it on the parties would be counterproductive.
Just as problematic was the question of mediator accountability. A lively
debate arose in most groups over whether mediators ought to work under the
auspices of the state or whether they ought to operate independent of the state.
Fedor advocated state control. Like many others, he saw advokaty, who have
to pass something akin to a bar exam, but then are independent to pick their
clients, as a good model. An equal number expressed concern over
contributing to the ever-increasing size of the state bureaucracy. A few veered
into a conspiratorial view of mediation as a way of providing sinecures for the
children of the political elite.0 2
100 Psychologists remain somewhat controversial in Russia. One Voronezh participant
belittled their potential contribution, asking whether going to a psychic might be better.
... As Ivan, a 51-year-old Novosibirsk construction worker, reminded his group:
"We're forgetting something important. Every person has a different psyche. Let's say I'm
a vicious man and the partner with whom I am negotiating is reticent and taciturn."
"°2According to Marina, a 44-year-old Novosibirsk bookkeeper, the precinct where
her policeman-husband works recently hired the daughter of a top official who had just
finished her education. Others agree that nepotism is a perennial problem in Russia. Marina
says that such inexperienced but well-connected young people will be unable to succeed
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F. Legal Culture
When I visited Russian courthouses and talked to judges about mediation,
the common refrain was that "parties are not ready" (storony ne gotovy).10
3
Legal scholars generally agree. The evidence from the focus groups is more
mixed. 10 4 In some of the groups, participants parroted this line, saying that
Russians are not ready for mediation. Nikolai, a 36-year-old Voronezh
construction worker, expanded on this argument.
[Mediation] is a long-term process. Sooner or later we'll come
around to it. We become more civilized as society
develops.... [The law] appeared only in 2011 and we haven't
heard about it. Our state is only 20 years old.... We are not
yet mature enough; we are like little children.
Larisa, a 35-year-old worker who was part of the same group as Nikolai, put
it more succinctly, saying that for mediation to take hold in Russia, "our
mentality will have to change completely."
Perhaps this self-flagellation is overkill. After all, many of the questions
raised by the participants are legitimate. They echo concerns raised by the
experts who have studied mediation carefully. Both groups puzzle over the
appropriate qualifications and accreditation for mediators. Both agree that the
failure of mediation to take hold is driven in part by the unfamiliarity of the
terminology.
But the argument that "litigants are not ready" has more traction when it
comes to the willingness to accept that mediation brings value to the dispute
resolution process. Many of the focus group participants were not prepared to
concede this point. They saw mediators as duplicating the functions of
attorneys or judges, and could not understand why they should have to pay
twice for the same service. More generally, most of them could not understand
why anyone would voluntarily opt for mediation over a court-based process,
especially one that is likely to be expensive. The reaction of Gennadii, a 31-
year-old Voronezh entrepreneur, illustrates the resistant attitude:
as mediators. In a sarcastic tone, she says, "What's the use?.. .You'll have some kind of
young girl (devochka) sitting there. Are people going to spill their guts to her? This won't
be of any help."
103 Hendley, supra note 34, at 437.
104E.g., Spravka, supra note 8; Tiul'kanov, supra note 5, at 35.
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In my opinion, I personally don't consider myself more stupid
than this mediator, therefore I will not go to him and will not
pay him money. I will resolve this question myself.... If
needed, I would be better off hiring a iurist and not a mediator.
A good advokat. And I will pay them two times more, but will
be more certain that everything will be normal.
Not everyone was as recalcitrant. Some were cautiously optimistic for the
prospects of mediation, but these were the minority. This group agreed that the
chances for mediation were greater in the hypothetical disputes with neighbors
and family than in the disagreement with an outlet of a retail chain store over
a malfunctioning cell phone.
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
This leaves us with the eternal lament of Russians, what is to be done (chto
delat')?I°5 More specifically, what can be done to spur the use of mediation
by ordinary Russians? The scholarly literature emphasizes the need for
legislative changes. While these might be helpful at the margins, the reactions
of ordinary Russians leave little doubt that their skepticism about mediation is
not driven by the technical language of the law. Instead, much like Tom
Hanks' character in the film Big, they just don't get it. They cannot see why
mediation is preferable to litigation.
Making mediation mandatory in some or all cases might help close this
gap. Comparative experience indicates that mediation is slow to integrate itself
into the legal culture when it is entirely voluntary. 10 6 Yet voluntariness is a
foundational principle of mediation, which Russia has endorsed. 107 Other
countries have mandated mediation in some or all cases as a prerequisite to
05 This phrase was the title of two books, both of which had a profound impact on
Russian political history. See NIKOLAI G. CHERNYSHEVSKII, CHTO DELAT'?: IZ RASSKAZOV
O NOVYKH LIUDIAKH (1863); VLADIMIR !. LENIN, CHTO DELAT' (1902).
106 See generally, Lukas Wiget, Compulsory Mediation as a Prerequisite Before
Commencement of Court Proceedings-Useful Requirement to Save Resources or Waste
of Time and Money? (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2012-47, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=2157385; Wissler, supra note 40, at
565; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 9, at 241. For a comparative assessment of the use
of mediation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Variations in the Uptake of and Resistance to
Mediation Outside of the United States, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2014 (Arthur W. Rovine, ed.,
2015).
07 "Ob al'temativnoi", supra note 2, at art. 3.
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bringing a dispute to court.108 Because parties are not required to persevere
through a mediated settlement, but can walk away at any time, they reason that
this requirement does not compromise the voluntariness of the process. °9
Although making mediation mandatory has sometimes backfired, 110 the
evidence shows that many parties who are railroaded into mediation find it
helpful, even when it fails, and that they opt for mediation on their own
volition when other problems arise.I
Russian scholars are aware of the positive effect elsewhere of mandatory
mediation.1' 2 Some wonder whether Russia ought to require mediation as a
prerequisite to litigation in some or all cases. The law is silent on this
question. l 3 At a 2012 round-table discussion, Bol'shova, a former arbitrazh
judge, argued that Russia has a historical legacy to draw upon. 114 She
reminded her colleagues of the requirement for industrial enterprises to send a
letter laying out their grievances, known as a pretenziia, before initiating a
lawsuit during the Soviet era and the early post-Soviet years.115 She claimed
that this pretenzionnyi system forestalled upwards of 90% of disputes from
proceeding to court. While not advocating a return to the past, she favors
making pre-trial mediation mandatory for economic disputes. 116
Reshetnikova, a current arbitrazh judge, likewise supports mandatory
mediation for such disputes.' Others are less confident that the principle of
voluntariness can be maintained if mediation becomes a requirement. Valerii
S. Seleznev, the chairman of the Duma's property committee, spoke for many
when he dismissed the idea of mandatory mediation as "something absolutely
108 Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 988-1006; Wissler, supra note 40, at 572.
109 Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 985-1007.
110 See, e.g., Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered
Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 272 (1992)
.. See, e.g., Dorcas Quek, Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the
Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 482 (2010); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in
General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 641, 695 (2002).
12 Anna Mikhailova, Obiazatel'naia mediatsiia: poisk kompromissa, VESTNIK
GOSUDARSTVENNOGO GUMANITARNOGO UNIVERSITETA, NO. 3 (2013) at 138; Stenogramma,
supra note 7.
113 Mikhailova, supra note 112, at 139.
14 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
11 For more on how the pretenzionnaia sistema worked, see Kathryn Hendley,
Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Business Disputes in Russia, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF
LAW IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES (Peter Murrell ed., 2001).
116 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
117 Reshetnikova, supra note 59.
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incomprehensible."' 18 The courts are only beginning to weigh in. When a
retailer tried to have a case dismissed because the disgruntled consumer failed
to live up to a mandatory mediation clause, the Irkutsk court invalidated the
clause, arguing that mediation is inherently voluntary, so cannot be
compelled.119 Of course, courts would quickly change their tune if the law
itself was amended to require mediation.
The prospect of mandatory mediation was not addressed systematically by
the focus group participants. A few participants predicted that trying mediation
might eventually become a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit. But this was put
forward as a worst-case scenario that might result from the ever-encroaching
nature of Russian bureaucracy. No one championed this sort of development.
Although the participants did not know the lore of mediation, they seemed to
instinctively recognize that voluntariness lies at its core. Liubov, a 61-year-old
Novosibirsk pensioner, analogized the situation to helping addicts: "This
reminds me of the therapy for alcoholics. Clinics that take people say: 'Yes,
yes, we will cure you, but only if you yourself want it.' And he doesn't want
it. And the relatives can do nothing.... How do you persuade someone who
doesn't want it?" Liubov has put her finger on the Achilles heel of mandatory
mediation. If the parties are resistant, then it potentially turns into a delaying
tactic.
120
Russia stands at a crossroads. If the law remains as is, then mediation will
likely drift off into obscurity. 121 Russians' ignorance will doom it to
irrelevance. But if the incentives are reconfigured, either by reimbursing some
11 Stenogramma, supra note 7.
119 Alekseeva, supra note 36.
120 Mediation was made mandatory for home foreclosures in Florida in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis, but the Florida Supreme Court terminated the program at the end
of 2011. One reason was the lack of interest of both homeowners and lenders and the
unwillingness of lenders to offer concessions. See Amy Loftsgordon, Florida's
Foreclosure Mediation Program, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/floridas-foreclosure-mediation-program.html. For an overview of such
programs, see generally Shana H. Khader, Mediating Mediations: Protecting the
Homeowner's Right to Self-Determination in Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 44
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 109 (2010).
121 A good example is the introduction of lay assessors into the arbitrazh courts in the
2002 revision of the Arbitrazh Procedural Code. APK RF, supra note 65, at art.19. They
are industry experts that, at the request of litigants, can sit alongside judges and weigh in
on decisions. Arbitrazh judges did not support this reform and have not encouraged their
use. Kathryn Hendley, Reforming the Procedural Rules for Business Litigation in Russia:
To What End? 11 Demokratizatsiya 363, 366 (2003). In 2015, these lay assessors were
called upon in only four of the over 1.5 million cases handled by the arbitrazh courts.
Otchet o rabote arbitrazhnykh sudov sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 2015 godu,
http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=3423.
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part of the filing fees when disputes are resolved via mediation or by making
mediation a prerequisite for initiating certain types of cases, then it could
become a vibrant part of the legal landscape. 22 Only time will tell which path
Russia will take. Even if Russia takes a more activist approach to mediation,
there is no guarantee that ordinary Russians will take notice. The low costs
associated with litigating may leave them indifferent or even resistant to
mediation over the long run.
122 For example, the arbitrazh courts introduced an accelerated procedure
(uproshchennoe proizvodstvo) for simple debt cases in 2002. A lack of precision in the
statutory language made judges hesitant to use it. Kathryn Hendley, Accelerated Process
in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts, in 52 PROBS. OF POST-COMMUNISM 21, 27-30 (2005).
When the wording was clarified in 2012, judges embraced it enthusiastically, thereby
easing their workload. Hendley, supra note 71, at 821-22.
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